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Does Doe v. Mattis Open the Door to
Citizen-Detainee Transfer?
Amy Greer, Ph.D.*
INTRODUCTION

Whether the Executive of the United States is allowed to
forcibly transfer a U.S. citizen-enemy combatant to a foreign
nation—a foreign nation without jurisdiction over that citizen—to
be adjudicated for terrorism-related crimes is a question that
remains open following the United States Court of Appeals for the
District of Columbia Circuit’s (D.C. Circuit) decision in Doe v.
Mattis. 1 In that decision, the D.C. Circuit upheld the United States
District Court for the District of Columbia’s (district court)
injunction that enjoined the U.S. government from transferring
John Doe, 2 a U.S. citizen, to Country B 3 and ordered the
* Candidate for J.D., Roger Williams University School of Law, 2020;
Ph.D. and M.S., Simmons University; M.A., University of Pittsburgh; B.A.,
Wheaton College (MA). I would like to thank Professor Peter Margulies for his
guidance and support, along with my family and friends for cheering me on.
p 1. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2018). On June 28, 2019, the
D.C. Circuit reissued its opinion without any substantial changes to the
previously published opinion. For that reason, this paper cites to the recorded
opinion. To see the reissued opinion, visit: https://www.cadc.uscourts.gov/
internet/opinions.nsf/6CE73195C9DC8F1285258427004F9D3C/$file/18-5032.
pdf [https://perma.cc/ELT2-V4NJ].
2. John Doe is now known to be Abdulrahman Ahmad Alsheikh. See
Charlie Savage et al., American ISIS Suspect Is Freed After Being Held More
Than a Year, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 29, 2018), https://www.nytimes.com/
2018/10/29/us/politics/isis-john-doe-released-abdulrahman-alsheikh.html
[https://perma.cc/49ZL-R3R3]. However, for the purposes of this paper, and to
remain consistent with the language used throughout the course of this case,
Mr. Alsheikh will be referred to as John Doe.
3. Country B is purported to be Saudi Arabia. See id.
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government to provide seventy-two hours’ notice before
transferring Doe to Country A. 4 Specifically at issue was whether
the Executive has the general transfer authority or the wartime
authority to “forcibly—and irrevocably—transfer [John Doe or
another citizen Islamic State (“ISIS”) fighter] to the custody of
another country.” 5 The D.C. Circuit decision provided a possible
roadmap to determine how Doe may have been resolved by the
Supreme Court of the United States (the Court) through the D.C.
Circuit’s application of Hamdi v. Rumsfeld 6 and Munaf v. Geren 7
to the facts of Doe’s case.
This Comment will examine the D.C. Circuit’s application of
Munaf to the facts of Doe to propose a rationale to be considered
should the Court grant certiorari for a similar case in the future.8
Specifically, this Comment argues that the D.C. Circuit’s narrow
interpretation of Munaf in Doe was an important but inadequate
protection of the constitutional rights of U.S. citizen-enemy
combatants. Additionally, this Comment asserts that the D.C.
Circuit’s extension of the Hamdi requirements for detaining a
4. Doe, 889 F.3d at 768. Country A is purported to be Syria. See Savage
et al., supra note 2.
5. Doe, 889 F.3d at 747. Following the D.C. Circuit’s decision, the district
court would have heard the merits of the case, but the parties reached an
agreement on October 28, 2018, leaving the many pressing issues raised in Doe
undecided. See Doe v. Mattis—Challenge to Detention of American by U.S.
Military Abroad, ACLU, https://www.aclu.org/cases/doe-v-mattis-challengedetention-american-us-military-abroad [https://perma.cc/3YHJ-SK6H] (last
updated Oct. 29, 2018); see also Robert Chesney, Doe v. Mattis Ends with a
Transfer and a Cancelled Passport: Lessons Learned, LAWFARE (Oct. 29, 2018,
11:14 AM), https://www.lawfareblog.com/doe-v-mattis-ends-transfer-andcancelled-passport-lessons-learned. The government frequently used the
acronym “ISIL” to describe the Islamic State of Iraq and the Levant in its court
filings, while the ACLU used “ISIS.” To remain consistent, this paper will use
the term “ISIS” to encompass ISIS, ISIL, and Daesh.
6. Doe, 889 F.3d at 758. The D.C. Circuit majority opinion relied heavily
on the analysis in Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507 (2004).
7. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
The majority in Doe
distinguished Munaf from Doe. See Doe, 889 F.3d at 753, 758. The dissent
relied heavily on Munaf to justify the transfer of Doe. See id. at 769
(Henderson, J. dissenting).
8. Recognizing, however, that given The N.Y. Times reporting discussed
below, the government is unlikely to attempt to bring such a suit, and in fact,
“several officials said the Pentagon would try hard to avoid taking custody of
citizens who may be captured by allies in the future—unless prosecutors say
they can be charged.” Savage et al., supra note 2.
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citizen-enemy combatant applies to the forcible transfer of those
citizen-enemy combatants, which creates an additional safeguard
to ensure that the government cannot circumvent said
requirements when the particular circumstances of Munaf do not
apply.
Part I of this Comment will introduce the facts and travel of
Doe v. Mattis, beginning with a background as to how Doe came into
U.S. custody, how the ACLU discovered Doe, and how the
subsequent legal proceedings unfolded. Part II will briefly
introduce Hamdi and analyze the application of Hamdi to the
central issue in Doe. Part III will introduce the facts and opinion of
Munaf. Part IV will identify the areas where Munaf can be
compared to and where it must be differentiated from Doe. Part IV
will also suggest a plausible outcome in the event that a case like
Doe ever returns to the D.C. Circuit or reaches the Court.
I.

FACTS AND TRAVEL OF DOE V. MATTIS

Doe is a dual citizen of the United States and Saudi Arabia. 9
On or around September 11, 2017, the Syrian Democratic Forces
(SDF) captured Doe “at a checkpoint on an active battlefield
adjacent to territory controlled by [ISIS].” 10 Doe was alone and
traveled on foot, wearing non-traditional clothing for the region. 11
The SDF turned Doe over to U.S. forces after he requested to “speak
to the Americans.” 12
He was subsequently detained and
interrogated in an American prison in Iraq. 13
The United States Department of Defense (DoD) alleged that
Doe was a registered ISIS fighter between 2014 and his capture in
2017, as gleaned through interrogation and investigation.14 More
specifically, DoD alleged that Doe
joined ISI[S], attended an ISI[S] training camp, swore
bayat to ISI[S]’s leader, and worked for ISI[S] in various
9. Respondent’s Factual Return at 2, Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195
(D.D.C. 2018) (No. 1:17-cv-2069).
10. Id. However, recent reporting indicates that Doe was actually
captured by Kurdish forces operating in Syria. See Savage et al., supra note 2.
11. Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 32.
12. Id. at 33.
13. See id. at 2.
14. Id. at 31, 33. According to the Respondent’s Factual Return, ISIS has
its members fill out registration forms for new recruits. Id. at 31.
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capacities, including as an Administrator responsible for
distributing vehicles and money to other ISI[S] members;
as a guard for an oil field under ISI[S] control; as a monitor
ensuring adherence by Imams and prayer callers to Sharia
requirements; and as a monitor of civilians working in
ISI[S]’s heavy equipment office. 15
Additionally, Doe purportedly used social media to promote
ISIS messages, viewed ISIS videos on YouTube, and Googled ISIS
information. 16 The DoD also noted that Doe claimed that he had
been kidnaped by ISIS and was only released from prison because
he agreed to work for ISIS; he also claimed that he had attempted
to escape from ISIS control. 17 However, the DoD was skeptical
about Doe’s tale of escape given that Doe was allegedly entrusted
with money, equipment, and the protection of mosques by ISIS
leaders afterwards.18 Moreover, the DoD offered evidence allegedly
linking Doe to ISIS, including thumb drives containing records of
ISIS casualty reports and ISIS-related social media engagement. 19
The DoD claimed the preceding facts established its burden of
showing by a preponderance of the evidence that Doe “[was] part of
or substantially supported [ISIS].” 20 Thus, the DoD classified Doe
as an enemy combatant. 21
In September 2017, the American Civil Liberties Union
(ACLU) “express[ed] deep concern” over the reported detention of
an American citizen in a U.S. military prison in Iraq. 22 The ACLU
determined that the DoD was holding an “Unnamed U.S. Citizen”
(Doe) as an enemy combatant in an unnamed location in unknown
conditions. 23 Though the International Committee for the Red
Cross had been allowed to visit Doe, the ACLU asserted that he was
15. Id. at 33.
16. Id. at 44–49.
17. Id. at 39–40.
18. See id. at 40.
19. Id. at 41, 44.
20. Id. at 53.
21. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 747 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
22. See Letter from Anthony D. Romero, Exec. Dir., ACLU, to Gen. James
N. Mattis & Att’y Gen. Jefferson B. Sessions III, Trump Admin. (Sept. 29, 2017)
https://www.aclu.org/letter/aclu-letter-trump-administration-detainedamerican-suspected-fighting-isis [https://perma.cc/U933-28LE].
23. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus at 4–5, ACLU Found. v. Mattis,
286 F. Supp. 3d. 53 (D.D.C. 2017) (No. 1:17-cv-2069).
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being held “without access to a lawyer, without access to any court,
and without a meaningful opportunity to challenge his detention
before a neutral decisionmaker.” 24 The ACLU sent a letter to the
DoD urging the government to transfer Doe to the United States
and bring criminal charges against him in a “proceeding governed
by the constitutional safeguards due to all criminal defendants.” 25
The DoD did not respond. Shortly thereafter, the ACLU filed its
next friend Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus (Petition) against
General Mattis (Mattis) in his official capacity as Secretary of
Defense in the district court on October 5, 2017. 26
In its Petition, the ACLU made five claims to support the relief
it sought for Doe. First, the ACLU argued that Doe had been
detained in violation of the Non-Detention Act and the Federal
Habeas Corpus statute because Congress had not expressly
authorized the detention of alleged ISIS fighters, nor had it
suspended habeas corpus. 27 Second, the ACLU averred that the
DoD was violating Doe’s Fourth Amendment right to be presented
before a judicial officer, to have charges brought against him, and
to have probable cause shown to justify his detention.28 Third, the
ACLU contended that Doe had been denied the opportunity to be
heard and to contest his detention in front of a “neutral
decisionmaker.” 29 Fourth, the ACLU asserted that Doe had been
denied the right to counsel, a right that the Court has extended to
alleged enemy combatants. 30 The ACLU’s final claim was that Doe
had been unlawfully detained for the purposes of interrogation,
violating the Court’s holding in Hamdi. 31 Accordingly, the ACLU
requested that the district court order the DoD to: (1) allow the
ACLU to meet with Doe; (2) cease all interrogations of Doe; (3)
provide notice to the district court and the ACLU prior to any
transfer of Doe to another U.S. facility, jurisdiction, or another
nation’s custody; (4) provide information about Doe’s transfer
should a transfer occur; (5) declare unconstitutional and unlawful
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.
30.
31.

Id. at 6.
Id.
Id. at 3.
See id. at 8–9.
Id. at 10.
Id. at 10–11.
Id. at 11.
Id. at 11–12.
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the indefinite detention of Doe; and (6) order the DoD to charge Doe
with federal crimes in an Article III court or release him. 32
In response, Mattis filed a motion to dismiss for three primary
reasons. First, Mattis raised the procedural question of allowing
the ACLU to bring suit without identifying the “name of the real
party in interest.” 33 Next, Mattis challenged the ACLU’s next
friend status, claiming that the ACLU had no relationship with Doe
and did not seek Doe’s best interests, and thus lacked standing to
bring the Petition.34 Finally, Mattis argued that if the court
granted the next friend status to the ACLU, the court should
dismiss the Petition because it would cause the court to interfere
with the executive branch’s power over military operations.35
Further, Mattis stated that Doe did not have a right to counsel
while the DoD was “in the process of determining what its final
disposition of this individual would be” or while Doe was being held
in an armed conflict zone in Iraq. 36
In the district court, Judge Chutkan held that the ACLU
qualified as next friend and had standing to file the Petition on
Doe’s behalf. 37 She also held that Doe was entitled to have access
to counsel because the government at that point had three months
to ascertain the status of Doe. 38 In addition, the government could
not strip Doe of his right to an attorney because the inconvenience
and challenging circumstances for the government should not
“outweigh the necessity of providing the detainee with the access to
the counsel he requested months ago.” 39 Judge Chutkan then
issued an order denying the government’s motion to dismiss and
demanding that it provide the ACLU with “immediate and
unmonitored access” to Doe, and that it “refrain from transferring
[Doe] until the ACLU[] inform[ed] the court of [Doe’s] wishes.” 40
Doe agreed to representation by the ACLU and the case continued.
32. Id. at 12–13.
33. Respondent’s Motion to Dismiss and Response to Court’s Order of
October 19, 2017 at 3, Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (D.D.C. 2018) (No.
1:17-cv-2069).
34. Id. at 5.
35. See id. at 2.
36. See id. at 16–17, 21.
37. ACLU Found. v. Mattis, 286 F. Supp. 3d 53, 60 (D.C.C. 2017).
38. Id.
39. Id.
40. Id.
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In January of 2018, the government gave an indication that it
was considering transferring Doe to two possible countries. 41 In
response, the ACLU filed a motion for continued relief seeking to
enjoin the government from transferring Doe. 42 On January 23,
2018, Judge Chutkan denied the ACLU’s request to enjoin
transferring Doe until the merits of the Petition had been decided,
but granted a seventy-two hour notice requirement before the
government could transfer Doe. 43 Judge Chutkan limited her
ruling to the notice requirement because the government was
considering a number of options as to Doe’s disposition, and she
could not deny the government entirely of an option it had not yet
exercised. 44 However, Judge Chutkan did actively, if briefly,
question the government’s authority to transfer Doe, suggesting
that the government could potentially lose on the transfer issue
should it choose to exercise that option. 45 The government
eventually came to an agreement with Country B and provided
notice to Doe and the district court. 46 On April 19, 2018, Judge
Chutkan enjoined the government from effectuating the transfer.47
The government filed an appeal following the issuance of Judge
Chutkan’s January order requiring that the government give both
Doe and the court seventy-two hours’ notice before executing a
transfer. 48 Meanwhile, Doe asked the D.C. Circuit to enjoin the
government from forcibly transferring him while the habeas
petition was pending. 49 The government also appealed Judge
Chutkan’s April injunction requiring the government to provide

41. See Savage et al., supra note 2. Country A is purported to be Syria and
Country B is purported to be Saudi Arabia. See id.
42. Doe v. Mattis, 288 F. Supp. 3d. 195, 197 (D.D.C. 2018).
43. Id.
44. Id. at 199.
45. See id. at 198–99.
46. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 748 (D.C. Cir. 2018). This transfer was
most likely to Saudi Arabia where Doe would be imprisoned. See Savage et al.,
supra note 2. Additionally, the government seemed to have wanted to avoid
the Petition by releasing Doe in Syria. See id. Both were blocked by the D.C.
Circuit ruling. See id.
47. Preliminary Injunction Order, Doe, 288 F. Supp. 3d 195 (No. 1:17-cv2069).
48. Doe, 889 F.3d at 747.
49. Id.
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notice as to an impending transfer of Doe. 50 The D.C. Circuit
upheld both the seventy-two hour notice requirement and the
injunction enjoining the government from transferring Doe to
Country B. 51
Additionally, the D.C. Circuit held that the
government could not forcibly transfer Doe to Country A without
notice. 52 Upon the D.C. Circuit’s decision, Mattis and Doe returned
to the district court to further navigate the Petition process.
Between May and October 29, 2018, the government and Doe
remained in dialogue to arrive at an agreement. The New York
Times reported that “prosecutors raised concerns that if they
brought [Doe] to the United States and charged him with providing
material support to a terrorist group, a judge might rule their
evidence inadmissible—and then they would have to free him on
domestic soil.” 53 Further, the government decided that Doe was
“unimportant” in the national security world; thus, “[government
officials] were keen to avoid a ruling on whether they had legal
authority to indefinitely detain a suspected Islamic State member
as a wartime prisoner, lest an adverse decision in the detention case
undermine the broader war effort.” 54 With these concerns in mind,
Doe and the government negotiated an agreement, finalized on
October 29, 2018, where Doe forfeited his American passport,
though not his citizenship, and was released in Bahrain where his
wife and child are residing. 55
II. ANALYSIS OF THE D.C. CIRCUIT’S APPLICATION OF HAMDI IN DOE

In the Doe majority decision, the D.C. Circuit based much of its
analysis on the Supreme Court’s decision in Hamdi. 56 Before
reaching the issues outlined in Hamdi, the court stated that “the
fact that a foreign country may have prescriptive jurisdiction over
an American citizen who is outside its territory hardly means that,
as long as the citizen is somewhere else abroad, the Executive has
power to seize her and deliver her to that foreign country.” 57 The
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 750.
Id. at 748.
See id. at 768.
See Savage et al., supra note 2.
Id.
See id.
See Doe, 889 F.3d at 758–68.
Id. at 756.
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Executive does not have “the unilateral power to forcibly transfer
an American citizen to another country merely because she travels
abroad.” 58 However, the D.C. Circuit concluded that the Executive
has the authority to transfer U.S. citizen enemy combatants to
allied countries during an armed conflict through the Executive’s
wartime powers under the law of war. 59 It was because of that
principle that the D.C. Circuit turned to Hamdi for further
guidance on the issue. 60
A. Facts and Travel of Hamdi
Yaser Hamdi, an American citizen, was captured and detained
in Afghanistan in 2001 during U.S. military action against the
Taliban. 61 The Court granted certiorari to address whether the
U.S. government could detain a U.S. citizen as an enemy combatant
for the duration of the conflict with the Taliban and “to address the
process that is constitutionally owed to one who seeks to challenge
his classification as [an enemy combatant].” 62 The Court first held
that Congress authorized the Executive to detain U.S. citizenenemy combatants during armed conflict through its passage of the
2001 Authorization for Use of Military Force (AUMF). 63 Secondly,
the Court held that upon the capture, detention, and classification
as an enemy combatant abroad, the citizen-detainee retains his due
process rights. 64 Thus, the Executive must give notice of the factual
basis of the citizen’s enemy combatant status to the detainee and
provide the detainee “a fair opportunity to rebut the government’s
factual assertions before a neutral decisionmaker.” 65 The Court
58. Id. at 757.
59. Id. at 758.
60. See id.
61. Hamdi v. Rumsfeld, 542 U.S. 507, 510 (2004).
62. Id. at 509.
63. Id. at 518 (citing Authorization for Use of Military Force, Pub. L. No.
107-40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001)). The Court reasoned that detention “is so
fundamental and accepted an incident to war as to be an exercise of the
‘necessary and appropriate force’ Congress has authorized the President to
use.” Id. However, the Court declined to reach the question of whether the
President has Article II powers to detain U.S. citizen enemy combatants. Id.
at 516–17. For a full discussion of the 2001 AUMF, see infra p. 22.
64. See Hamdi, 542 U.S. at 537.
65. Id. at 533. The Court noted that the due process requirement for
citizen detainees applied absent the suspension of habeas corpus by Congress.
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emphasized that “the threats to military operations posed by a basic
system of independent review are not so weighty as to trump a
citizen’s core rights to challenge meaningfully the government’s
case and to be heard by an impartial adjudicator.” 66
B. The D.C. Circuit’s Application of the Hamdi Analysis to Doe
In Doe, the D.C. Circuit held that the Executive’s authority to
detain citizens and its authority to transfer citizens “essentially rise
[and] fall together.” 67 The court relied on Hamdi to find that the
government could only transfer Doe if it could show that “it [was]
legally authorized to use military force against ISI[S]” and that it
had “afford[ed] Doe an adequate opportunity to challenge the
Executive’s factual determination that he [was] an ISI[S]
combatant.” 68 In large part, the D.C. Circuit’s reasoning was
predicated on the notion that the Hamdi Court allowed a citizen to
challenge both the military authority to detain him and the factual
basis for his detention—the latter of which is a changeable status.69
The logical extension of that holding, the court reasoned, must be
that it would apply to the irrevocable process of transferring a
citizen-detainee to a foreign country. 70 Through the engagement of
Hamdi in its decision, the D.C. Circuit established that Hamdi
must be part of the analysis courts conduct when reviewing
transfers of U.S. citizens. Additionally, the D.C. Circuit’s decision
See id. at 537. Furthermore, the Court stated that when due process is
required, the processes by which such notice and opportunity to be heard are
effectuated may differ due to the exigencies of armed conflict. Id. at 533.
66. Id. at 535. Justice O’Connor continued:
[A] state of war is not a blank check for the President when it comes
to the rights of the Nation’s citizens. . . . [I]t would turn our system of
checks and balances on its head to suggest that a citizen could not
make his way to court with a challenge to the factual basis for his
detention by his Government, simply because the Executive opposes
making available such a challenge.
Id. at 536–37.
67. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 759 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
68. Id. at 758.
69. Id. at 763–64.
70. Id. See Munaf and the analysis below for more details about the
Court’s holding that the United States can transfer a U.S. citizen
to some foreign countries depending on the circumstances. The courts analyze
the issue of transfer by examining whether a treaty or statute exists or whether
territorial jurisdiction, passive personality jurisdiction, and dual citizenship
apply.
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highlighted the need to tailor judicial review to ensure that the
Executive cannot circumvent the procedural protections the Court
imposed in Hamdi when it wants to transfer a citizen enemy
combatant. 71
III. FACTS AND TRAVEL OF MUNAF V. GEREN

In its analysis of Doe’s transfer, the D.C. Circuit engaged in a
deep discussion of the Court’s holding in Munaf v. Geren, and that
opinion’s relationship to the central issue in Doe—the transfer of an
American citizen to another country.72 Chief Justice Roberts
authored the Court’s unanimous decision in Munaf. 73 He stated
that the central issue was whether district courts “may exercise
their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin our Armed Forces from
transferring individuals detained within another sovereign’s
territory to that sovereign’s government for criminal
prosecution.” 74 In particular, the Court contemplated how the
analysis of this issue changes when the detention and transfer
occur “in the context of ongoing military operations conducted by
American Forces overseas.” 75 The allegations against defendants
Munaf and Omar 76 were that they “ha[d] committed hostile or
warlike acts in Iraq, pending investigation and prosecution in Iraqi
courts under Iraqi law.” 77
Shawqi Omar, a dual citizen of the United States and Jordan,
claimed he voluntarily traveled to Iraq to find “reconstructionrelated work” following the U.S. invasion of Iraq in 2004.78 The
71. See id.
72. See id. at 752. Indeed, the lone dissent, written by Judge Henderson,
relied primarily on Munaf as a justification to transfer Doe. See id. at 769–70
(Henderson, J., dissenting).
73. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 679 (2008).
74. Id. at 689.
75. Id.
76. Munaf as heard by the Court was the result of two district court cases,
Omar v. Harvey and Munaf v. Geren, with very similar facts that yielded two
different decisions. See Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115 (D.D.C.
2006); Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19 (D.D.C. 2006). Both defendants
appealed to the D.C. Circuit, and the court again came to two different results.
See Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007); Omar v. Harvey, 479 F.3d
1 (D.C. Cir. 2007). The Court then granted certiorari and the cases were joined
under Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674 (2008).
77. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 679.
78. Omar, 479 F.3d at 3.
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U.S. government stated that U.S. military forces, as part of MultiNational Force-Iraq (MNF-I), captured Omar while conducting a
raid on Abu Masab al-Zarqawi, an infamous former leader of Al
Qaeda Iraq (AQI). 79
The government asserted that Omar
“facilitated terrorist activities both inside and outside of Iraq,” 80
and “commit[ed] militant acts” against the U.S. and its allies.81 A
three-member “MNF-I tribunal” of American military officers
determined Omar was a “security internee” because he posed a
threat to Iraq, and that Omar was an “enemy combatant” in the war
on terrorism because of his alleged affiliation with AQI. 82 The
government claimed this panel was conducted in accordance with
Article 5 of the Geneva Convention, where Omar heard the evidence
against him, was able to make a statement, and was allowed to
bring in “immediately available witnesses.” 83 Omar’s case was reassessed later by the Combined Review and Release Board (CRRB),
including American members of MNF-I, and the CRRB determined
Omar remained a threat to Iraq.84 The CRRB later referred Omar
to the Central Criminal Court of Iraq (CCCI) to be charged and
tried. 85 Omar’s wife and son filed a motion to enjoin the transfer in
the district court.86 The district court granted and the D.C. Circuit
upheld the injunction. 87 At the time Munaf was heard by the
Court, Omar had not yet been charged with any crimes by the
CCCI. 88
Mohammad Munaf, a dual citizen of the United States and
Iraq, claimed he voluntarily traveled to Iraq in 2005 to serve as an
interpreter for Romanian journalists. 89 Shortly after their arrival
in Iraq, the journalists were kidnaped and held captive for two

79. Id.
80. Id.
81. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 681.
82. See id. at 681–82.
83. Id. at 681.
84. Id. at 682.
85. Omar, 479 F.3d at 4. The Court noted that Omar would have already
been charged and possibly tried by the CCCI but for his habeas petition.
Munaf, 553 U.S. at 693–94.
86. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 682.
87. Id. (citing Omar, 479 F.3d at 1).
88. Id.
89. Id. at 683.
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months. 90 MNF-I forces detained Munaf because they suspected
him of “orchestrating” the kidnapings. 91 Munaf then underwent
the same military tribunal process described above. 92 He was
referred to the CCCI where he was subsequently convicted of
kidnaping and sentenced to death. 93 His sentence was later
vacated and a new trial was granted. 94 Munaf remained in the
custody of the U.S. military while he awaited a new trial in the
CCCI. 95 Munaf’s family filed a habeas petition that was dismissed
by the district court for lack of jurisdiction. 96 The D.C. Circuit then
affirmed the dismissal. 97 Munaf appealed, and the Court granted
certiorari, consolidating Munaf and Omar into Munaf v. Geren.98
In Munaf, the Solicitor General argued that the U.S. military,
as part of MNF-I, was not acting as the United States, but rather
as a part of a “multinational force,” depriving Article III courts of
jurisdiction to hear habeas petitions from detained American
citizens in Iraq. 99 The Solicitor General used Hirota v. MacArthur,
a 1948 Court decision, to support that position. 100 Because
members of the U.S. military were not accountable to a separate
MNF-I authority, but instead to the U.S. military command
structure, the Court gave little weight to the multi-national
character of MNF-I. 101 The Court then distinguished Munaf and

90. Id.
91. Id.
92. Id.
93. Munaf v. Geren, 482 F.3d 582, 582 (D.C. Cir. 2007), vacated, Munaf,
553 U.S. 674 (2008).
94. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 684.
95. Id.
96. Id. (citing Mohammed v. Harvey, 456 F. Supp. 2d 115, 118, 122 (D.D.C.
2006)).
97. Id. (citing Munaf, 482 F.3d at 582).
98. Id. at 685.
99. Id.
100. Id. at 686–87. The Hirota decision stated that the Court did not have
jurisdiction to hear habeas claims by Japanese citizens detained, tried, and
convicted in Japan by the International Tribunal for the Far East, and thus
denied their petitions. Id. at 686–87; see also Hirota v. MacArthur, 338 U.S.
197 (1948).
101. See Munaf, 553 U.S. at 687–88 (citing Hirota, 338 U.S. at 198–99).

160 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:147
Omar’s circumstances from those of the petitioners in Hirota,102
holding that citizens detained overseas “by American soldiers
subject to a [U.S.] chain of command” shall not be precluded from
filing habeas petitions in U.S. courts. 103
Next, the Court considered whether “United States district
courts may exercise their habeas jurisdiction to enjoin [U.S.] Armed
Forces from transferring individuals detained within another
sovereign’s territory to that sovereign’s government for criminal
prosecution” during “ongoing military operations.” 104
After
reviewing the lower courts’ decisions, the Court examined the
merits of both habeas petitions because there were “sensitive
foreign policy issues” being litigated that required them to do so. 105
The Court held that the U.S. government could transfer Omar and
Munaf to the Iraqi authority and the CCCI to be adjudicated. 106 To
support this opinion, the Court reviewed both statutory and
precedential history.
First, the Court discussed international law and the accepted
principle that “[a] sovereign nation has exclusive jurisdiction to
punish offenses against its laws committed within its borders,
102. Id. at 688. The majority rejected the government’s argument that
Hirota held the appropriate gravitas on which to place a case such as Munaf.
See id. at 686–88.
103. Id. at 688. The Court noted that while the government of Iraq retains
ultimate responsibility for “the arrest, detention and imprisonment of
individuals who violate its laws,” it is the MNF-I that “maintains physical
custody” of any such individuals during Iraqi criminal proceedings. Id. at 698.
The detention facilities are “under the command of United States military
officers who report to General David Petraeus,” thus the United States
retained its authority over Munaf and Omar, answering the jurisdiction
question. Id. at 681, 686.
104. Id. at 689.
105. Id. at 692 (citing Youngstown Sheet & Tube Co. v. Sawyer (Steel
Seizure), 343 U.S. 579, 584–585 (1952)). The Court noted in the case of Omar
that the lower courts erroneously granted an injunction to enjoin Omar’s
transfer when they declared the jurisdictional issues “so serious, substantial,
difficult, and doubtful, as to make them fair ground for litigation and thus for
more deliberative investigation” before a transfer could occur. Id. at 690
(quoting Omar v. Harvey, 416 F. Supp. 2d 19, 23–24, 27 (D.D.C. 2006)). The
Court suggested that hard jurisdictional issues are not enough to use the
“extraordinary and drastic remedy” of an injunction. Id. at 676. The lower
courts erred in dismissing Munaf’s habeas petition due to lack of jurisdiction,
as the Court had found that Article III courts can hear petitions from American
citizens held by the American military overseas. Id. at 688, 691.
106. See id. at 692.
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unless it expressly or impliedly consents to surrender its
jurisdiction.” 107 A sovereign’s right to adjudicate crimes committed
within its borders or against its people 108 exists “whether or not the
pertinent criminal process comes with all the rights guaranteed by
our Constitution.” 109 Chief Justice Roberts stated that “[n]ot only
have we long recognized the principle that a nation state reigns
sovereign within its own territory, we have twice applied that
principle to reject claims that the Constitution precludes the
Executive from transferring a prisoner to a foreign country for
prosecution in an allegedly unconstitutional trial.”110 Judicial
review of such cases requires an examination of whether a statute
or the Constitution precludes an American citizen from being
transferred or extradited. 111 In particular, the Court asserted that
it would not issue a court order “requiring the United States to
shelter [citizens] from the sovereign government seeking to have
them answer for alleged crimes committed within that sovereign’s
borders.” 112
One of the cases referenced above in which the Court rejected
a claim that the Constitution precluded the Executive from
transferring a prisoner to a foreign country was Wilson v. Girard.
In Wilson, an American citizen and member of the U.S. military
killed a Japanese woman. 113 Japan wanted to exercise its right to
adjudicate the matter in order to vindicate the rights of its own
citizen, but it had ceded some of its (normally exclusive) jurisdiction
to adjudicate crimes committed within its borders to the United
States as a part of an international treaty. 114 The Court reviewed
that treaty to determine if the United States waiving a possible
claim to adjudication jurisdiction over Wilson was precluded by a

107. Id. at 694–95 (quoting Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 529 (1957)).
108. See Am. Soc’y Int’l L., Jurisdictional, Preliminary, and Procedural
Concerns, in BENCHBOOK ON INTERNATIONAL LAW § II.A (Diane Marie Amann
ed., 2014), www.asil.org/benchbook/jurisdiction.pdf [https://perma.cc/ V69ZU9H9] (discussing bases upon which sovereigns found power to adjudidcate
individuals).
109. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 695.
110. Id.
111. See Wilson v. Girard, 354 U.S. 524, 530 (1957) (per curiam).
112. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 694.
113. Wilson, 354 U.S. at 525.
114. See id. at 526–28.
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statute or the Constitution. 115 If the waiver was not precluded, the
United States wanted to carry it out for comity-related reasons and
to avoid a dispute over which country truly had “primary
jurisdiction.” 116 The Court found that nothing in the Constitution
nor any statute enacted subsequent to the treaty prevented the
United States from waiving its jurisdiction. 117 The Court in 2008
applied similar reasoning—that nothing in the Constitution nor
any statute or treaty allowed an American court to prevent a
foreign country from adjudicating a crime committed within its
borders—to hold that the United States could transfer Omar and
Munaf to Iraqi custody so that Iraq could exercise its sovereign
right to prosecute crimes committed within its own borders. 118
Second, the Court discussed Omar and Munaf’s argument that
Valentine v. United States 119 was the more appropriate precedent
to apply to their case. 120 In particular, the petitioners argued that
the “Executive may not extradite a person held within the United
States unless ‘legal authority’ to do so ‘is given by act of Congress
or by the terms of a treaty.’” 121 That was essentially the inverse of
the government’s argument in Wilson. The Court’s analysis in
Valentine differed from that in Wilson because the American
citizens to be transferred had already returned to the United
States, so Wilson was not an extradition case while Valentine
was. 122 While it is possible for the President and Congress to allow
American citizens to be extradited to foreign sovereigns for
prosecution, the Court in Valentine held that this Executive
115. Id. at 530.
116. See id. at 529.
117. See id. at 530.
118. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 696 (2008). The Court also
discussed Neely v. Henkel, 180 U.S. 109 (1901), where the United States
permitted an American citizen accused of violating Cuban law to be transferred
to Cuba for adjudication even though “Cuban law did not provide the panoply
of rights guaranteed [Neely] by the Constitution of the United States.” Id.
119. Valentine v. United States ex rel Neidecker, 299 U.S. 5 (1936). Two
American citizens were accused of committing crimes in France and had
already returned to the United States when France approached the United
States to request transfer. Id. at 6. The Court held that the Executive did not
have the inherent power to transfer U.S. citizens already on U.S. soil to France
without Congressional authorization through treaty or statute. Id. at 18.
120. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 704.
121. Id. (quoting Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9).
122. Id.
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authority solely comes from Congressional action, (i.e., ratifying
treaties or passing laws) and is not part of the Executive’s
constitutional authority.123
The Court distinguished Munaf from Valentine. 124 Chief
Justice Roberts asserted that there is a major difference between
the Executive extraditing a citizen held in the United States and
the Executive transferring to a sovereignty “an individual captured
and already detained in that country’s territory.” 125 Munaf and
Omar voluntarily traveled to Iraq and allegedly committed crimes
therein, thus they were “subject to the territorial jurisdiction of that
sovereign, not of the United States.”126
Additionally, the
petitioners were being held by the U.S. military acting as part of
MNF-I and on behalf of the Iraqi government, making it all the
more absurd that the petitioners could not be transferred to the
CCCI for adjudication.127 Indeed, the Court referred back to Wilson
as the appropriate precedent to apply to Munaf: it sought statutory
or constitutional language that would preclude the petitioners’
transfer and found none. 128 Thus, the Court held that the two men
had no claim for relief. 129
IV. APPLYING MUNAF TO DOE TO ANALYZE THE GOVERNMENT’S
AUTHORITY TO TRANSFER AN ALLEGED U.S. CITIZEN-ENEMY
COMBATANT

In a two-to-one decision, the D.C. Circuit foreclosed the
government’s efforts to transfer Doe to Country B, and required
seventy-two hours’ notice if it intended to transfer him to Country
A. 130 However, this issue could well arise again given the potential
for the capture of another American citizen fighting for ISIS

123. Valentine, 299 U.S. at 9.
124. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 704.
125. Id.
126. Id.
127. Id.
128. Id. at 705.
129. Id.
130. See Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 768 (D.C. Cir. 2018). Again, Country
A and Country B likely were Syria and Saudi Arabia. Savage et al., supra note
2.
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overseas 131 and the strength of Judge Henderson’s dissent, which
could very well become the majority opinion in another such
case.132 To that end, this section will examine further the ways in
which Munaf is analogous to or can be distinguished from Doe in
order to supply a better rationale that is more protective of
individual rights than the D.C. Circuit’s method.
Justice Souter wrote a separate concurrence in Munaf in which
he outlined the eight “circumstances essential to the Court’s
holding,” offering a narrow reading of the decision. The list is
helpful in analyzing the application of Munaf to the facts in Doe.
Justice Souter wrote:
(1) Omar and Munaf “voluntarily traveled to Iraq.” They
are being held (2) in the “territory” of (3) an “ally” of the
United States, (4) by our troops, (5) “during ongoing
hostilities” that (6) involv[e] our troops.” (7) The
government of a foreign sovereign, Iraq, has decided to
prosecute them “for crimes committed on its soil.” And, (8)
“the State Department has determined that . . . the
department that would have authority over Munaf and
Omar . . . as well as its prison and detention facilities have
generally met internationally accepted standards for basic
prisoner needs.” 133
The first seven of the eight circumstances are highly relevant
factors that could impact the fate of another John Doe and are fully
examined below.

131. See ALEXANDER MELEAGROU-HITCHENS ET AL., THE TRAVELERS:
AMERICAN JIHADISTS IN SYRIA AND IRAQ 2, 75, 77 (2018),
https://extremism.gwu.edu/sites/g/files/zaxdzs2191/f/TravelersAmericanJihad
istsinSyriaandIraq.pdf [https://perma.cc/2HBJ-8MDL]; see also Mark Berman,
Young Men Left America to Join ISIS. They Ended Up Cooking and Cleaning
for the Caliphate., WASH. POST (Feb. 8, 2018), https://www.
washingtonpost.com/news/post-nation/wp/2018/02/08/young-men-left-america
-to-join-isis-they-fled-when-it-didnt-live-up-to-their-expectations/
[https://perma.cc/P7YN-NTRH].
132. Doe, 889 F.3d at 784 (Henderson, J., dissenting) (arguing that Munaf
should control the Doe decision, thus Doe’s petition should be denied and the
government may either continue to detain Doe or transfer him to “an ally with
a facially strong interest in him”).
133. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 706 (Souter, J., concurring) (alteration in original)
(citations omitted).
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First, Justice Souter noted the issue of voluntary travel. In
Munaf, Omar and Munaf had traveled to Iraq of their own
volition.134 Similarly, Doe voluntarily traveled to Syria. 135 In both
cases, the petitioners advanced innocent explanations for their
travels in an attempt to counter the alleged purpose advanced by
the government. 136 The Court seemed to put significance on this
factor in Munaf because it assigned some weight to the fact that
petitioners had voluntarily entered a sovereign land, allegedly
committed crimes therein, and then tried to evade accountability
for those crimes within the country. 137 However, while Doe entered
Syria voluntarily, Syria was not seeking to prosecute him. 138
Numbers two through four in Justice Souter’s list include that
the U.S. citizens were being held “in the ‘territory’ of [] an ‘ally’ of
the United States” by U.S. troops.” 139 As with Omar and Munaf,
Doe was held in Iraq, an ally of the United States, by U.S. forces.
While all three men were in “the immediate ‘physical custody’ of
American soldiers [or American law enforcement officers] who
answer[ed] only to an American chain of command,” the story of
Doe diverged from those of Omar and Munaf. 140 Omar and Munaf
were held by the U.S. military on behalf of the Iraqi Interim
Government while Iraq conducted investigations and brought or
sought to bring charges against Omar and Munaf for activities
allegedly committed inside Iraq as part of Al Qaeda. 141 In contrast,
Doe was held by the U.S. military on behalf of the U.S. military
134. Id. at 694 (majority opinion).
135. Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 35.
136. Munaf claimed to have entered Iraq to serve as a translator for
Romanian journalists. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 683. Omar claimed he entered Iraq
in 2002 to find work in the reconstruction effort. See Urgent Action: Man
Arbitrarily Held After Serving Sentence, AMNESTY INT’L (Nov. 14, 2013),
https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/16000/mde140182013en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GYS4-GWZ7]. Doe claimed to have entered Syria as a
journalist seeking to report on ISIS. Petitioner’s Response to the Respondent’s
Factual Return at 1, Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (No. 1:17-cv2069).
137. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 694.
138. Nothing in the materials submitted by the ACLU or the government
suggested that Iraq or any other nation was actively seeking to prosecute as a
right of its sovereignty.
139. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 706 (Souter, J., concurring).
140. Id. at 685 (majority opinion).
141. See id. at 680–81.
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while the DoD conducted investigations to determine Doe’s status,
stating Doe had allegedly committed crimes in Syria as part of
ISIS. 142 Just as the Court held in Munaf, the D.C. Circuit held that
because Doe was detained by the U.S. military under an American
chain of command and the “[U.S.] official charged with his
detention ha[d] ‘the power to produce’ him,” the federal district
courts had jurisdiction to hear Doe’s Habeas Petition. 143 However,
the distinction regarding who was investigating the respective
defendants, and for what purpose, is critical regarding whether the
court will affirm or deny the transfer of U.S. citizens to a foreign
government for adjudication.
Numbers five and six of Souter’s list stated that the citizens
were captured and detained “during ongoing hostilities” that
“involv[e] our troops.” 144 Omar and Munaf were captured in 2004
and 2005 respectively by U.S. forces operating under the authority
of MNF-I that were undertaking a military mission sanctioned by
Congress through both the 2001 AUMF 145 and the 2002 AUMF, 146
as well as the United Nations Security Council (UNSC) resolutions

142. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 749 (D.C. Cir. 2018).
143. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 686.
144. Id. at 706 (Souter, J., concurring) (alteration in original).
145. Congress passed the 2001 AUMF to authorize the Executive’s use of
“necessary and appropriate force” against “nations, organizations, or persons
he determines planned, authorized, committed, or aided the terrorist attacks
that occurred on September 11, 2001.” Authorization for Use of Military Force,
Pub. L. No. 107–40, 115 Stat. 224 (2001). The ACLU contended that Congress
was very specific in its authorization, limiting the President to use force only
against those who perpetrated or aided in the perpetration of the September
11, 2001 attacks. Petitioner’s Response to the Respondent’s Factual Return,
supra note 136, at 10–12.
146. In 2002, Congress passed an AUMF to authorize the Executive’s use of
“necessary and appropriate” force to defend the United States from the threat
of Iraq and “to enforce all relevant United Nations Security Council resolutions
regarding Iraq.” Authorization for Use of Military Force Against Iraq
Resolution of 2002, Pub. L. No. 107–243, 116 Stat. 1498 (2002). The ACLU
argued that, based on its review of the legislative history, the 2002 AUMF was
not intended to extend to terrorist groups operating in Iraq, or to extend
beyond the Iraqi borders, but instead was solely intended to provide
Congressional authorization to overthrow Hussein and eliminate the threat
Hussein posed to the United States and the rest of the world, per the UNSC
resolutions. Petitioner’s Response to the Respondent’s Factual Return, supra
note 136, at 29–33.
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enacted between 1996 and 2007. 147 Between 2004 and 2005, Iraq’s
fledgling Interim Government was in place and the U.S. had
transitioned from occupier to member of MNF-I to assist the
Interim Government. 148 The Iraqi Interim Government was an ally
to the United States in its efforts to stabilize Iraq and suppress the
militant opposition to both the American occupation and the
Interim Government. 149 The U.S. military fought alongside
twenty-six other nations and Iraqi government forces, all with
authorization from Congress and a mandate from the UNSC. 150
Thousands of U.S. troops were on the ground in active combat from
2003 through 2011.151 However, in 2011, President Obama
officially ended the Iraq War, withdrawing thousands of U.S. troops
and transitioning U.S. forces to training and strategic support
roles. 152
As the government noted in its Factual Return in Doe, Al
Qaeda, the Taliban, and their related local subsidiaries were the
primary targets of U.S. forces in both Iraq and Afghanistan. 153
When both Omar and Munaf were captured between 2004 and
2005, the Iraqi Interim Government and MNF-I forces were
147. See U.N. Documents for Iraq: Security Council Resolutions, SECURITY
COUNCIL REP., https://www.securitycouncilreport.org/un_documents_type/
security-council-resolutions/page/2?ctype=Iraq&cbtype=iraq%2F#038 [https://
perma.cc/KAH9-7572] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019). The earlier resolutions
related to Iraq’s attempts to generate nuclear weapons and its unwillingness
to comply with disarmament. Id. In 2002, the resolution was related to Iraq’s
unwillingness to allow inspectors in to determine the nature of the weapons.
Id. The resolutions passed from 2003 through 2007 related to occupation and
the creation of MNF-I. Id.
148. Iraq Profile—Timeline, BBC (Oct. 3, 2018), https://www.bbc.com/
news/world-middle-east-14546763 [https://perma.cc/LE8D-JJQG].
149. Id.; see also Kyle Crichton et al., Timeline of Major Events in the Iraq
War, N.Y. TIMES, https://archive.nytimes.com/www.nytimes.com/interactive/
2010/08/31/world/middleeast/20100831-Iraq-Timeline.html#/#time111_3262
[https://perma.cc/FS5W-PKG2] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019); The Iraq War: 20032011, COUNCIL ON FOREIGN REL., https://www.cfr.org/timeline/iraq-war
[https://perma.cc/7BNJ-6FA5] (last visited Nov. 7, 2019).
150. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 679 (2008); Authorization for Use of
Military Force Against Iraq Resolution of 2002.
151. The Iraq War: 2003-2011, supra note 149.
152. Press Release, The White House, Remarks by the President on Ending
the War in Iraq, (Oct. 21, 2011), https://obamawhitehouse.archives.gov/thepress-office/2011/10/21/remarks-president-ending-war-iraq [https://perma.cc/
KG5K-C6BA].
153. Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 5–9.
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intensely fighting against Al Qaeda and insurgent attacks in
Iraq.154 Omar was suspected of participating in Al Qaeda, and
Munaf of “pos[ing] a serious threat to Iraqi security” as an
insurgent. 155 The U.S. government argued that both AUMFs and
UNSC resolutions provided the necessary authority for the United
States capture and detention of Omar and Munaf; the Court
agreed. 156
In Doe, the government argued that the 2001 AUMF and 2002
AUMF authorized the Executive to fight ISIS because ISIS
“[o]riginated from the Al-Qa[e]da Terrorist Organization,” the very
group the 2001 AUMF was specifically targeting.157 Because ISIS
originated from Al Qaeda, it reasoned, the AUMFs authorize the
military detention of those who are “part of” or “substantially
support” ISIS. 158 Further, it asserted that Congress has affirmed
that use of the AUMFs by “repeatedly and specifically fund[ing]
military actions against ISI[S] through an unbroken stream of
appropriations over multiple years.” 159 The government concluded
that the DoD, during active hostilities involving U.S. troops acting
on behalf of the President, had the authority to both detain and
transfer Doe. 160
The ACLU did not contest the fact that there are ongoing
hostilities between the United States and ISIS, or that American
troops are involved in those hostilities. Instead, the ACLU
questioned the Executive’s authority to use military force against
ISIS. The ACLU argued that the Executive, in fact, did not have
the authority to indefinitely detain or forcibly transfer an American
citizen classified as an ISIS enemy combatant.161 Furthermore, the
ACLU asserted that in 2017, a full sixteen years after September
11, 2001, and when Doe was captured as an alleged ISIS fighter,
154. The Iraq War: 2003-2011, supra note 149.
155. Munaf, 553 U.S. at 680–81, 683–84.
156. Id. at 679–80.
157. Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 5–12.
158. Id. at 12–22.
159. Id. at 22.
160. Id. at 53–54.
161. Petitioner’s Response to the Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note
136, at 3–4. That challenge also extended to the U.S. military’s denial of Doe’s
access to an attorney and to a hearing in front of a neutral arbiter to challenge
his designation of enemy combatant. Petition for a Writ of Habeas Corpus,
supra note 23, at 4–6.
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neither the 2001 AUMF nor the 2002 AUMF authorized the
President to indefinitely detain an American citizen without
congressional suspension of habeas corpus because that violates
both habeas law and the Non-Detention Act. 162 Instead, the ACLU
asserted the government was obligated to either release Doe or
bring Doe to the United States to be charged and tried in an Article
III court in accordance with his constitutional rights as a U.S.
citizen. 163
Finally, Justice Souter highlighted that “[t]he government of a
foreign sovereign . . . ha[d] decided to prosecute [U.S. citizens] ‘for
crimes committed on its soil.’” 164 Omar and Munaf, as noted above,
were captured and detained by U.S. forces acting on behalf of the
Iraqi Interim Government, had allegedly committed crimes in Iraq,
and Iraq, as a sovereign, sought to vindicate its sovereign right to
prosecute crimes committed within its boundaries and against its
citizens.165 The Court allowed the transfer of Omar and Munaf,
both American citizens, to Iraq because of this trifecta, and because
there were no statutes or constitutional provisions in operation to
preclude such a transfer. Thus, Omar and Munaf’s petitions were
denied because “[h]abeas corpus does not require the United States
to shelter fugitives from the criminal justice system of the sovereign
with authority to prosecute them.” 166 Doe’s situation differs greatly
from that of Omar and Munaf. “Doe did not . . . commit crimes
within the receiving country’s territory and he has not (to date)
been charged with any offense there.”167 The government stated
162. Petitioner’s Response to the Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note
136, at 3–4, 36–39. Additionally, the ACLU argued that the National Defense
Appropriations Act of 2012 and other appropriations acts do not give the
government authority to detain indefinitely or forcibly transfer American
citizens. Id. at 33–36. According to the ACLU, Article II of the Constitution
does not give the President authority to “detain [citizens] indefinitely without
congressional authorization,” which, it argued, the President does not have
with regard to ISIS fighters. Id. at 36–40.
163. Id. at 2.
164. Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 706 (2008) (Souter, J., concurring).
165. Id. at 694–95 (majority opinion).
166. Id. at 705.
167. Doe v. Mattis, 889 F.3d 745, 777 (D.C. Cir. 2018) (Henderson, J.,
dissenting). Judge Henderson followed this statement with a qualification that
“the difference between the two cases is not as stark as Doe would have it”
because Omar had also not yet been charged with a crime by Iraq at the time
his petition was heard. Id. at 777. However, this qualification seems negligible

170 ROGER WILLIAMS UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [Vol. 25:147
that Doe was working with ISIS while in Syria, a country with
whom the United States is frequently in conflict. 168 However, the
government does not claim that Doe ever took up arms against the
United States or other forces, or that he committed acts of violence
against civilians inside or outside of Syria. 169
Unlike in Munaf, where the Iraqi government actively sought
to prosecute Omar and Munaf because the alleged crimes were
committed on its territory, the U.S. government in Doe
acknowledged that no country, including Syria, was actively
seeking to vindicate its sovereign rights to prosecute Doe. In fact,
the government stated they were in the
process of determining the appropriate disposition of [Doe],
including whether the appropriate course of action is to
prosecute [Doe] criminally [in the United States] (such as
for material support of terrorism), to continue detaining
[Doe] as an enemy combatant, or to relinquish custody of
[Doe] to another sovereign with its own legitimate interest
in him. 170
However, in her dissent, Judge Henderson stated that Country
B “ha[d] a facially strong—for that matter, all but undisputed—
interest in the transfer.” 171 This “facial” or “legitimate” interest
seemed to be a significantly lesser interest than the threshold
interest the Court recognized in Munaf—territoriality. 172 Judge
Henderson argued for the extension of the comity aspect of the
Munaf decision.173 She stated:
given that the country that would be bringing the charges did so because it had
a sovereign right to prosecute crimes committed within its territory. Id. at 753
(majority opinion).
168. Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 9, at 4–5; see Bureau of Near
Eastern Affairs, U.S. Relations with Syria: Bilateral Relations Fact Sheet, U.S.
DEP’T ST. (Jul. 23, 2018), https://www.state.gov/r/pa/ei/bgn/3580.htm
[https://perma.cc/WYH6-VU62].
169. Petitioner’s Response to Respondent’s Factual Return, supra note 136,
at 3–4.
170. Respondent’s Factual Return supra note 9, at 2 (emphasis added).
171. Doe, 889 F.3d at 777 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
172. See Munaf v. Geren, 553 U.S. 674, 692–93 (2008). In Wilson and Neely,
the Court also recognized the sovereign rights and interests of both Japan and
Cuba “in prosecuting crimes committed within its borders, [and the] Court
found no ‘constitutional or statutory’ impediment to the United States’s waiver
of its jurisdiction under the agreement[s].” Id. at 705.
173. Doe, 889 F.3d at 777 (Henderson, J., dissenting).
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Comity is ‘a courtesy’ towards ‘the laws and usages’ of
another nation. By definition it counsels ‘mutual
recognition of legislative, executive, and judicial acts’ that
go well beyond prosecutorial prerogatives. In some cases,
then, comity weighs against blocking a captive’s transfer
even if the receiving country claims no immediate interest
in prosecuting him for a territorial offense. 174
In Doe’s case, comity might have been a plausible argument for
the government to support the transfer of Doe to Saudi Arabia
because both Saudi Arabia and the United States can claim
jurisdiction over Doe as a citizen; 175 comity would appear to be
barred as a basis for transferring Doe elsewhere given the
precedent set by Munaf, Wilson, and Valentine. And, they are
dangerous precedents to overturn.
In Munaf, the Court distinguished the situation of Munaf and
Omar from that of the petitioner in Valentine, and instead applied
Wilson, because Iraq already had control over the petitioners, even
if through MNF-I. 176 This reasoning is not as easily applied in Doe.
Doe was not captured by or held in the country in which he
committed his alleged crimes, as was the defendant in Wilson. 177
Doe had not perpetrated his alleged acts of material support
against the country or the citizens of the country to which the
Executive desired to transfer him, unlike the petitioners in
Valentine and Munaf. 178 Doe was detained by the United States—
174. Id. (citations omitted).
175. Id. at 747 (majority opinion).
176. As noted above, the Court in Munaf emphasized that the petitioners in
that case were captured and detained in the sovereign territory of the country
with the sovereign right to adjudicate them for their crimes, thus there was no
need for a treaty or statute to exist to support the transfer. Munaf, 553 U.S.
at 704. In Valentine, the U.S. citizens had already returned to the United
States after allegedly committing crimes in France and the Court held that the
Executive “may not extradite a person held within the United States unless
‘legal authority’ to do so ‘is given by act of Congress or by the terms of a treaty.’”
Id. (quoting Valentine v. United States, 299 U.S. 5 (1936)).
177. See id.; see also Doe, 889 F.3d at 747.
178. Doe’s acts were committed in Syria. Doe, 889 F.3d at 747. Conceivably,
Iraq could argue that it should have jurisdiction over Doe because he was
acting as a part of ISIL, the arm of ISIS that emanated from Iraq and whose
actions often cross over into the territorial bounds of Iraq; however, nothing in
the case record suggests that Iraq was one of the transfer locations being
considered.
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a country that currently had physical custody of Doe, of which Doe
was a citizen, and in which laws against the material support of
terrorism existed. 179 Given the foregoing, any case resembling Doe
must be distinguished from Munaf to preclude the application of
the government’s justification for transfer as asserted in Doe and
the circumvention of the protections established in Hamdi as
extended in Doe.
CONCLUSION

While Doe v. Mattis has been resolved, and Doe received the
release from detention he sought, a case like this could well arise
again. If it does, it seems likely the Court would hold that the
transfer of an American citizen to a foreign government is barred
without territorial, personal, or national jurisdiction to adjudicate
him, regardless of labeling that citizen an enemy combatant and
detaining him in a foreign country. As Jonathan Hafetz, lead
lawyer in Doe, noted:
The most chilling proposition of this case is that the
government thought it could dispose of the liberty of an
American citizen without any involvement of lawyers or
courts. A resounding message [from this case] is that the
government is going to think long and hard before it tries to
detain [and transfer] an American citizen without charges
again—and it should. 180
This case has left its mark and only time will reveal its impact.

179. Doe, 889 F.3d at 747; see 18 U.S.C. § 2339A-2339B (2009). Doe’s
circumstances were a bit muddled by the fact that he was a dual citizen, where
Saudi Arabia and the United States had equal claim to prosecute their own
citizen. See Am. Soc’y Int’l L., supra note 108, § II.A.
180. Savage et al., supra note 2.

